Buddhists, brahmins, and belief: epistemology in South Asian philosophy of religion

In Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief, Dan Arnold examines how the Brahmanical tradition of Purva Mimamsa and the writings of the seventh-century Buddhist Madhyamika philosopher Candrakirti challenged dominant Indian Buddhist views of epistemology. Arnold retrieves these two very different but equally...

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Autres titres:Buddhists, brahmins, & belief
Collaborateurs: Arnold, Daniel Anderson (Autre)
Type de support: Électronique Livre
Langue:Anglais
Service de livraison Subito: Commander maintenant.
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Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publié: New York Columbia University Press c2005
Dans:Année: 2005
Recensions:Dan Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of Religion, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, 328 pp., ISBN: 0-231-13280-8, hb (2007) (Herling, Bradley L.)
Sujets non-standardisés:B Mādhyamaka
B RELIGION ; Buddhism ; General
B PHILOSOPHY ; Epistemology
B Electronic books
B Knowledge, Theory of
B Knowledge, Theory of (Buddhism)
B Mādhyamika (Buddhism)
B Mîmâmsâ
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Résumé:In Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief, Dan Arnold examines how the Brahmanical tradition of Purva Mimamsa and the writings of the seventh-century Buddhist Madhyamika philosopher Candrakirti challenged dominant Indian Buddhist views of epistemology. Arnold retrieves these two very different but equally important voices of philosophical dissent, showing them to have developed highly sophisticated and cogent critiques of influential Buddhist epistemologists such as Dignaga and Dharmakirti. His analysis - developed in conversation with modern Western philosophers like William Alston and J.L. Austin - offers an innovative reinterpretation of the Indian philosophical tradition, while suggesting that pre-modern Indian thinkers have much to contribute to contemporary philosophical debates. In logically distinct ways, Purva Mimamsa and Candrakirti's Madhyamaka opposed the influential Buddhist school of thought that emphasized the foundational character of perception. Arnold argues that Mimamsaka arguments concerning the "intrinsic validity" of the earliest Vedic scriptures are best understood as a critique of the tradition of Buddhist philosophy stemming from Dignaga. Though often dismissed as antithetical to "real philosophy," Mimamsaka thought has affinities with the reformed epistemology that has recently influenced contemporary philosophy of religion. Candrakirti's arguments, in contrast, amount to a principled refusal of epistemology. Arnold contends that Candrakirti marshals against Buddhist foundationalism an approach that resembles twentieth-century ordinary language philosophy - and does so by employing what are finally best understood as transcendental arguments. The conclusion that Candrakirti's arguments thus support a metaphysical claim represents a bold new understanding of Madhyamaka
pt. 1: Buddhist Foundationalism -- pt. 2: The Reformed Epistemology of Purva Mimamsa -- pt. 3: The Metaphysical Arguments of Madhyamaka.
Description:Includes bibliographical references (p. [219]-305) and index. - Description based on print version record
ISBN:0231507798