An epistemic defeater for Islamic belief?

We aim to further develop and evaluate the prospects of a uniquely Islamic extension of the Standard Aquinas/Calvin model. One obstacle is that certain Qur’anic passages such as Surah 8:43–44 apparently suggest that Muslims have reason to think that Allah might be deceiving them. Consistent with per...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Baldwin, Erik (Author)
Format: Electronic/Print Article
Language:English
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Published: Taylor & Francis [2015]
In: International journal of philosophy and theology
Year: 2015, Volume: 76, Issue: 4, Pages: 352-367
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Islam / Cognition theory / Knowability of God / Truth theory
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
BJ Islam
VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:We aim to further develop and evaluate the prospects of a uniquely Islamic extension of the Standard Aquinas/Calvin model. One obstacle is that certain Qur’anic passages such as Surah 8:43–44 apparently suggest that Muslims have reason to think that Allah might be deceiving them. Consistent with perfect/maximally good being theology, Allah would allow such deceptions only if doing so leads to a greater good, so such passages do not necessarily give Muslims reason to doubt Allah’s goodness. Yet the possibility of deception of the faithful threatens to provide a subjective defeater for the (epistemic) reliability of their cognitive faculties. (‘Even if Allah can be morally good while deceiving, how do you know you aren’t being deceived for a greater good on a more macro level, such as about the nature of the Qur’an?’) Similar in structure to Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), this defeater threatens to undermine all of a Muslims warrant claims. We consider and evaluate the reply that there are other Qur’anic passages and/or additional conceptual resources in the Islamic tradition that provide grounds for thinking that God’s faithfulness or truthfulness is more centrally and securely embedded in a Muslim’s noetic structure than such doubts. Specifically, we will argue that under certain conditions, there exists a subjective defeater for some Muslims that, unlike McNabb’s approach, isn’t based off of the proper function condition but Plantinga’s truth aimed condition.
ISSN:2169-2327
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2015.1130642