The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion
In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been cl...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2018, Volume: 21, Numéro: 3, Pages: 477-488 |
RelBib Classification: | NCA Éthique VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Explanation
B Moral assertion B Moral understanding |
Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) |
Résumé: | In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little to no discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This paper aims to supply this lack: it defends a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion. According to this view, in virtue of its function of reliably generating understanding in the audience, a moral assertion that p needs be knowledgeable and accompanied by a contextually appropriate explanation why p. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6 |