Unbelievable Preambles: Natural Knowledge and Social Cooperation in Accepting Some Revelation
There is a claim that the natural capacity for knowledge of God (but not its completeexercise) is presupposed by the acceptance of any revelation. We inquire into whether this restriction is satisfactory. There is a stronger claim that natural knowledge has to be exercised for someone to welcome rev...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2018]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2018, Volume: 10, Issue: 3, Pages: 67-83 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Cognition theory
/ Knowability of God
/ Faith
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | There is a claim that the natural capacity for knowledge of God (but not its completeexercise) is presupposed by the acceptance of any revelation. We inquire into whether this restriction is satisfactory. There is a stronger claim that natural knowledge has to be exercised for someone to welcome revelation. There is an additional claim that natural knowledge of the preambles to the articles of faith may not obtain. We try to make sense of this doctrine of impeached preambles to faith, by considering its phrasing not only in the first person singular (where it generates a Moore's paradox), nor in the third person (where the role of the preambles still remains problematic), but in the first plural person, where it may suggest a kind of social division of tasks among believers. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v10i3.2610 |