Most Peers Don't Believe It, Hence It Is Probably False
Rob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination of his argu...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Beteiligte: | |
| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2017]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2017, Band: 9, Heft: 4, Seiten: 87-112 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Lovering, Rob
/ Theismus
/ Gottesbeweis
/ Kritik
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus NBC Gotteslehre |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
peer disagreement
B arguments for God's existence B Lovering |
| Online Zugang: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Rob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination of his argument. First we present Lovering's argument and point out its salient features. Next we explain why the argument's conclusion is entirely acceptable for theists, even if, as we show, there are multiple problems with the premises. |
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| Enthält: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v9i4.1987 |