Moral Philosophy after Austin and Wittgenstein: Stanley Cavell and Donald MacKinnon

There are broad commonalities between the projects of Donald MacKinnon (1913-1994) and Stanley Cavell (1926-) sufficient to make the claim that they struck an analogous pose in their respective contexts. This is not to discount their manifest differences. In the milieu of 1960s and 1970s Cambridge,...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bowyer, Andrew D. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Sage [2018]
In: Studies in Christian ethics
Year: 2018, Volume: 31, Issue: 1, Pages: 49-64
RelBib Classification:NBF Christology
NCA Ethics
TK Recent history
VA Philosophy
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Description
Summary:There are broad commonalities between the projects of Donald MacKinnon (1913-1994) and Stanley Cavell (1926-) sufficient to make the claim that they struck an analogous pose in their respective contexts. This is not to discount their manifest differences. In the milieu of 1960s and 1970s Cambridge, MacKinnon argued in support of a qualified language of metaphysics in the service of a renewed catholic humanism and Christian socialism. At Harvard, Cavell articulated commitments that made him more at home in the world of North American secular political liberalism. Where Nietzsche, Hume, Freud, Heidegger, Emerson and Thoreau were Cavell’s inspirations, Butler, Kant, G. E. Moore, Collingwood and the New Testament were MacKinnon’s. For all the stark differences, commonalities abound and the reason for this can be traced to a shared appreciation of Austin’s contribution to the ‘lingusitic turn’ together with Wittgenstein’s later work. They both developed projects obsessed with the problem of scepticism together with a commitment to a creative re-animation of moral discourse in light of it, with MacKinnon defending a qualified ‘moral realism’, and Cavell, ‘moral perfectionism’. Seen together, a distinctive post-Kantian and post-Wittgensteinian therapeutic moral philosophy is in evidence.
ISSN:0953-9468
Contains:Enthalten in: Studies in Christian ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1177/0953946817737927