Anselm's Metaphysics of Nonbeing
In his eleventh century dialogue De Casu Diaboli, Anselm seeks to avoid the problem of evil for theodicy and explain the fall of Satan as attributable to Satans own self-creating wrongful will. It is something, as such, for which God as Satans divine Creator cannot be held causally or morally resp...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2012]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 4, Issue: 4, Pages: 27-48 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In his eleventh century dialogue De Casu Diaboli, Anselm seeks to avoid the problem of evil for theodicy and explain the fall of Satan as attributable to Satans own self-creating wrongful will. It is something, as such, for which God as Satans divine Creator cannot be held causally or morally responsible. The distinctions on which Anselm relies presuppose an interesting metaphysics of nonbeing, and of the nonbeing of evil in particular as a privation of good, worthy of critical philosophical investigation in its own right. Anselms concept of nonbeing does not resolve the philosophical problem of evil implied by Satans fall from grace, but is shown perhaps more unexpectedly to enable Anselms proof for the inconceivable nonexistence of God as the greatest conceivable intended object of thought to avoid Kants Critique of Pure Reason objection to the general category of ontological arguments. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v4i4.258 |