Infinite Striving and the Infinite Subject: a Kierkegaardian reply to Schellenberg
In this paper I argue - pace J. L. Schellenberg - that it remains the case for Kierkegaard that infinite striving, properly understood, is essential to the relationship with God, who remains the Infinite Subject, one necessarily hidden for defensible logical, ontological, and existential reasons. Th...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2016]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2016, Volume: 8, Numéro: 4, Pages: 143-156 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Kierkegaard, Søren 1813-1855
/ Schellenberg, J. L. 1959-
/ Être humain
/ Relation
/ Dieu
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | In this paper I argue - pace J. L. Schellenberg - that it remains the case for Kierkegaard that infinite striving, properly understood, is essential to the relationship with God, who remains the Infinite Subject, one necessarily hidden for defensible logical, ontological, and existential reasons. Thus Kierkegaards arguments for the hiddenness of God as a logically required ingredient in the relationship that human beings are called to undertake with God can withstand Schellenbergs criticisms. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i4.1760 |