What May I Hope? Why It Can Be Rational to Rely on One's Hope
In hoping, what is important to us seems possible, which makes our life appear meaningful and motivates us to do everything within our reach to bring about the things that we hope for. I argue that it can be rational to rely on ones hope: hope can deceive us, but it can also represent things correc...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2014]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, Volume: 6, Issue: 3, Pages: 117-129 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Hope
/ Reason
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| RelBib Classification: | AE Psychology of religion |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In hoping, what is important to us seems possible, which makes our life appear meaningful and motivates us to do everything within our reach to bring about the things that we hope for. I argue that it can be rational to rely on ones hope: hope can deceive us, but it can also represent things correctly to us. I start with Philip Pettits view that hope is a cognitive resolve. I reject this view and suggest instead that hope is an emotion: hope is a felt evaluation for which we can define a corresponding character trait which in its turn qualifies as a virtue if it is felt whenever its correctness conditions are satisfied. For religious hope in particular it follows from my analysis that, if I believe, I may hope. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i3.166 |