Skeptical Theism Remains Refuted: a Reply to Perrine

In my 2013 article ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,’ I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of God’s existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypo...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Johnson, David Kyle (VerfasserIn)
Beteiligte: Perrine, Timothy (VerfasserIn des Bezugswerks)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Netherlands [2017]
In: Sophia
Jahr: 2017, Band: 56, Heft: 2, Seiten: 367-371
RelBib Classification:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
NBC Gotteslehre
VB Logik; philosophische Hermeneutik; philosophische Erkenntnislehre
weitere Schlagwörter:B Atheism
B Bayes Theorem
B Skeptical theism
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Zusammenfassung:In my 2013 article ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism,’ I argued that observing seemingly unjustified evils (SUEs) always reduces the probability of God’s existence. When figuring the relevant probabilities, I used a basic probability calculus that simply distributes the probability of falsified hypotheses equally. In 2015, Timothy Perrine argued that, since Bayes Theorem doesn’t always equally distribute the probability of falsified hypotheses, my argument is undermined unless I can also show that my thesis follows on a Bayesian analysis. It is the purpose of this paper to meet that burden.
ISSN:1873-930X
Bezug:Kritik von "A Note on Johnson’s ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism’ (2015)"
Enthält:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0599-4