Rawlsian Liberalism, Justice for the Worst Off, and the Limited Capacity of Political Institutions

This article argues that Rawlsian liberal political institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic welfare needs of the worst off are met. This argument consists of two steps. First, I show that institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic needs of the worst off are met without pursu...

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1. VerfasserIn: Cross, Ben (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Netherlands [2016]
In: Sophia
Jahr: 2016, Band: 55, Heft: 2, Seiten: 215-236
RelBib Classification:NCC Sozialethik
NCD Politische Ethik
VA Philosophie
ZC Politik
weitere Schlagwörter:B Difference Principle
B John Rawls
B Publicity
B Virtue
B Equality
B G.A. Cohen
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Zusammenfassung:This article argues that Rawlsian liberal political institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic welfare needs of the worst off are met. This argument consists of two steps. First, I show that institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic needs of the worst off are met without pursuing certain non-taxation-based courses of action that are designed to alter the work choices of citizens (NTMs). Second, I argue that such actions are not permissible for Rawlsian institutions. It follows that a state governed by a Rawls-type political conception of justice is parasitic on the willingness of citizens to be sufficiently motivated by concern for the worst off, but it cannot require or even encourage them to be so motivated.
ISSN:1873-930X
Enthält:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-015-0486-9