To be or Not to be Authentic: In Defence of Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal
It has recently been pointed out that the cloudiness of the concept of authenticity as well as inflated ideologies of the true self provide good reasons to criticize theories and ideals of authenticity. Nevertheless, there are also good reasons to defend an ethical ideal of authenticity, not least...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2017, Volume: 20, Numéro: 3, Pages: 567-580 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCB Éthique individuelle VA Philosophie ZD Psychologie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Authenticity
B Personne B Responsibility for ones self B Autonomy |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | It has recently been pointed out that the cloudiness of the concept of authenticity as well as inflated ideologies of the true self provide good reasons to criticize theories and ideals of authenticity. Nevertheless, there are also good reasons to defend an ethical ideal of authenticity, not least because of its critical and oppositional force, which is directed against experiences of self-abandonment and self-alienation. I will argue for an elaborated ethical ideal of authenticity: the ambitious ideal of a continuous self-reflective process of self-authentication. For this purpose, the ideal of being authentic in expressing and unfolding ones individual personality and characteristics will be combined with the ideal of being an authentic person - whereby a person is to be understood in a Kantian sense as an autonomous person who is (at least potentially) reasonable and morally responsible. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9803-4 |