Willful Ignorance
Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known. This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic)...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
|
| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2017, Volume: 20, Numéro: 1, Pages: 105-119 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCA Éthique VB Herméneutique; philosophie ZD Psychologie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Affected
B Willful B Motivated B Strategic B Ignorance B Inconvenience |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known. This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams (1994) and is contrasted with a recent account by Lynch (2016). |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9722-9 |