Disabled - therefore, Unhealthy?
This paper argues that disabled people can be healthy. I argue, first, following the well-known social model of disability, that we should prefer a usage of disabled which does not imply any kind of impairment that is essentially inconsistent with health. This is because (a) one can be disabled...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
|
| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2016, Volume: 19, Numéro: 5, Pages: 1259-1274 |
| RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropologie NCH Éthique médicale VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Disability
B Conceptual ethics B Health B Impairment |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | This paper argues that disabled people can be healthy. I argue, first, following the well-known social model of disability, that we should prefer a usage of disabled which does not imply any kind of impairment that is essentially inconsistent with health. This is because (a) one can be disabled only because limited by false social perception of impairment and (b) one can be, if impaired, disabled not because of the impairment but rather only because of the social response to it. Second, I argue that it is often wrong to use the term healthy in a way that makes health inconsistent with any degree whatsoever of health-relevant bodily dysfunction. Whether someone is healthy properly-so-called depends on standards of health presupposed in conversational context. Sometimes, I argue, these standards are or ought to be lax enough to allow some people with some health deficits still to count as healthy per se. Taking inspiration from David Lewis and Mary Kate Mcgowan, I go on to argue that denying that someone is healthy in a context typically succeeds in shifting going presuppositions to require standards strict enough to make that denial acceptable. And this, I conclude by arguing, often constitutes an abuse of conversational power. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9735-4 |