But for the Grace of God: Abortion and Cognitive Disability, Luck and Moral Status
Many theories of moral status that are intended to ground pro-choice views on abortion tie full moral status to advanced cognitive capabilities. Extant accounts of this kind are inconsistent with the intuition that the profoundly cognitively disabled have full moral status. This paper improves upon...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2017, Volume: 20, Numéro: 2, Pages: 257-277 |
| RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropologie NCG Éthique de la création; Éthique environnementale NCH Éthique médicale NCJ Science et éthique VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Modal theory of luck
B Cognitive Disability B Moral Status B Luck B Intuitions B Bioethics B animal ethics B Abortion B Moral Luck B intergroup bias B Personal Identity |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Many theories of moral status that are intended to ground pro-choice views on abortion tie full moral status to advanced cognitive capabilities. Extant accounts of this kind are inconsistent with the intuition that the profoundly cognitively disabled have full moral status. This paper improves upon these extant accounts by combining an anti-luck condition with Steinbocks stratification of moral status into two levels. On the resulting view, a being has full moral status if and only if (1) she has moral status and (2) (a) has had advanced cognitive capacities, (b) has the potential to develop such capacities, or (c) would have had such capacities were it not for luck. I argue that modal accounts of luck provide a non-speciesist basis for attributing the lack of advanced cognitive capacities in humans to luck without doing the same for non-human animals. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9755-0 |