Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios

What is the role of sceptical scenarios—dreams, evil demons, brains in a vat—in sceptical arguments? According to the error view, sceptical scenarios illustrate the possibility of massive falsity in one’s beliefs, whereas according to the ignorance view, they illustrate the possibility of massive ig...

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1. VerfasserIn: Kraft, Tim (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Brill 2015
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2015, Band: 5, Heft: 4, Seiten: 269-295
weitere Schlagwörter:B Cartesian scepticism sceptical scenarios brain in a vat error-possibilities ignorance-possibilities ignorance view epistemic closure kk-principle
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Zusammenfassung:What is the role of sceptical scenarios—dreams, evil demons, brains in a vat—in sceptical arguments? According to the error view, sceptical scenarios illustrate the possibility of massive falsity in one’s beliefs, whereas according to the ignorance view, they illustrate the possibility of massive ignorance not necessarily due to falsity. In this paper, the ignorance view is defended by surveying the arguments in favour of it and by replying to two pressing objections against it. According to the first objection, the ignorance view illicitly introduces the kk-principle into sceptical arguments. In reply I argue that kk is not less plausible than its main rival, the closure principle. According to the second objection, relying on veridical ignorance-possibilities contradicts the transparency of belief. In reply I introduce a version of transparency that is consistent with the ignorance view.
ISSN:2210-5700
Enthält:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-04010001