The problem of polytheisms: a serious challenge to theism
Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism and monotheism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of polytheism (We take 'theism' to mean 'classical theism', which is but one of many possible monotheisms. Avoiding much of the discu...
| Auteurs: | ; |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
|
| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2017, Volume: 81, Numéro: 3, Pages: 233-246 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Monothéisme
/ Théisme
/ Polythéisme
|
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Philosophers
B Theism B Polytheism B Argument from infinitely many alternatives B Monotheism B Transcendence (Philosophy) |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism and monotheism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of polytheism (We take 'theism' to mean 'classical theism', which is but one of many possible monotheisms. Avoiding much of the discussion around classical theism, we wish to focus on the challenges in arguing for monotheism over polytheism. We take monotheisms and polytheisms to be versions of supernaturalism, and not of 'theism'. We consider monotheisms and polytheisms to entail the notion of divine transcendence). We develop an argument from infinitely many alternatives, which decisively demonstrates that if a monotheistic or polytheistic god-model obtains, it will almost certainly be polytheistic. Probabilistic calculations are performed in order to illustrate the difficulties faced by the monotheistic proponent. After considering possible objections, such as whether there should be limits placed on how many possible god-models could obtain, we conclude that our argument from infinitely many alternatives is sound, and highly unlikely to be overcome. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-015-9554-x |