The rationality of faith and the benefits of religion
Religions don't simply make claims about the world; they also offer existential resources, resources for dealing with basic human problems, such as the need for meaning, love, identity, and personal growth. For instance, a Buddhist's resources for addressing these existential needs are dif...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2017
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2017, Volume: 81, Numéro: 1/2, Pages: 213-227 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Religion
/ Choix
/ Rationalité
/ Foi
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| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Buddhism
B Desire B Rationality B Religion B Value B Evidence B Faith B Religious Aspects B Emotion B EMOTIONS (Psychology) B Reason |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | Religions don't simply make claims about the world; they also offer existential resources, resources for dealing with basic human problems, such as the need for meaning, love, identity, and personal growth. For instance, a Buddhist's resources for addressing these existential needs are different than a Christian's. Now, imagine someone who is agnostic but who is deciding whether to put faith in religion A or religion B. Suppose she thinks A and B are evidentially on par, but she regards A as offering much more by way of existential resources. Is it epistemically rational for her to put her faith in A rather than B on this basis? It is natural to answer No. After all, what do the existential resources of a religion have to do with its truth? However, I argue that this attitude is mistaken. My thesis is that the extent to which it is good for a certain religion to be true is relevant to the epistemic (rather than merely pragmatic) rationality of faith in that religion. This is plausible, I'll argue, on the correct account of the nature of faith, including the ways that emotion and desire can figure into faith and contribute to its epistemic rationality. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9599-5 |