Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism
I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue ( pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law's (Relig Stud 46(3):353-...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2015
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2015, Volume: 77, Numéro: 1, Pages: 3-24 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Rationalism
B God Omniscience B GOOD & evil B Omnipotence B Evil god challenge B Reasons internalism B Religious Aspects B Research B Moral rationalism B God B Metaethics B Evidential problem of evil |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue ( pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law's (Relig Stud 46(3):353-373, ) evil god challenge. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-014-9472-3 |