Analysis of Public Media Discourses of the Main Actors of the Church Crisis in Ukraine
By analysing the main public statements of the actors of the church crisis in Ukraine, we managed to identify their basic narratives, main discursive logics, power positions, hidden motives and interests that influence social processes. To do this, we used the techniques of narrative analysis of pub...
| Auteurs: | ; |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
George Fox University
2024
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| Dans: |
Occasional papers on religion in Eastern Europe
Année: 2024, Volume: 44, Numéro: 1, Pages: 49-80 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Narrative
B public discourses B discursive power B Narrative analysis B Orthodox church crisis |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | By analysing the main public statements of the actors of the church crisis in Ukraine, we managed to identify their basic narratives, main discursive logics, power positions, hidden motives and interests that influence social processes. To do this, we used the techniques of narrative analysis of public discourses. The main actors (players, participants) in the church crisis are representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (next - UOC) and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (next - OCU), the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church (next - ROC), government agencies, popular media, international and Ukrainian experts. Theological, political, state, and mass-media types of discourses were identified. It turned out that the participants' narratives form pairs that are mirror combinations of rather polar discourses, whose narrative strategies reflect the interests of certain actors, structures, and social groups. At the same time, the participants use their own discourses, which are not always clear or acceptable to others, and the media present the different voices of discourses as a clash. The impossibility of a productive dialogue between the UOC and the OCU is due to the difference in narratives, different assessments of history and current events, and different political or corporate interests, although they speak the same theological language. It was found that not all of the UOC is a carrier of the Russian Orthodox Church's "Russian World" ideology. In the case of the UOC, we are faced with the phenomenon of a persistent conservative, corporate consciousness, fear of losing its sacred power, unwillingness and inability of the current leadership to change the church structure, to engage in dialogue with the OCU, and unwillingness to modernise the church. While the OCU, which is also in no hurry to change and renew itself, is successfully destroying the monopoly of the symbolic power of the UOC, showing that after receiving the Tomos, it has canonical equality in the Ecumenical Church. The difference in the capabilities of the actors is that the state operates in the field of secular law, and the church operates in the field of church law (canons), which do not coincide with each other, so it is impossible to resolve the conflict without the official consent of the UOC. However, the last one does not compromise, does not maintain a dialogue with the authorities, the OCU and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, instead it claims "persecution" in order to preserve the inviolability of its structures. |
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| ISSN: | 2693-2148 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Occasional papers on religion in Eastern Europe
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.55221/2693-2229.2480 |