Oppy on arguments and worldviews: an internal critique

This paper develops an internal critique of Graham Oppy’s metaphilosophy of religion – his theories of argumentation, worldview comparison, and epistemic justification. First, it presents Oppy’s views and his main reasons in their favor. Second, it argues that Oppy is committed to two claims – that...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Békefi, Bálint (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Nature B. V 2024
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2024, Volume: 95, Issue: 1, Pages: 61-76
Further subjects:B Graham Oppy
B Epistemic Justification
B Coherentism
B Metaphilosophy
B Theistic arguments
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)

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