Aristotle on Softness and Endurance: Nicomachean Ethics 7.7, 1150a9–b19
In Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (= Eudemian Ethics 6.7), Aristotle distinguishes softness (malakia) from lack of self-control (akrasia) and endurance (karteria) from self-control (enkrateia). This paper argues that unqualified softness consists of a disposition to give up acting to avoid the painful toil...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2024
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| Dans: |
Phronesis
Année: 2024, Volume: 69, Numéro: 1, Pages: 63-96 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Temperance
B Pain B Character B Endurance B Akrasia B softness |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | In Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (= Eudemian Ethics 6.7), Aristotle distinguishes softness (malakia) from lack of self-control (akrasia) and endurance (karteria) from self-control (enkrateia). This paper argues that unqualified softness consists of a disposition to give up acting to avoid the painful toil (ponos) required to execute practical resolutions, and (coincidentally) to enjoy the pleasures of rest and relaxation. The enduring person, in contrast, persists in her commitments despite the painful effort required to enact them. Along the way, I argue that this interpretation qualifies our understanding of the pleasures and pains with which temperance and intemperance are concerned. |
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| ISSN: | 1568-5284 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Phronesis
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685284-bja10082 |