The formative years of Iran’s ‘jihadi field diplomacy’ in Azerbaijan

This study examines the formative years of Iran’s so-called ‘jihadi field diplomacy’ toward Azerbaijan during and after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. To accomplish this, I adopt a novel version of neoclassical realism, which considers the socially constructed nature of variables. The application o...

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Auteur principal: Kızılyurt, Özgür (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2023
Dans: Politics, religion & ideology
Année: 2023, Volume: 24, Numéro: 3, Pages: 398-425
Sujets non-standardisés:B Azerbaijan
B Iran
B constructivist neoclassical realism
B coup
B Karabakh War
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Résumé:This study examines the formative years of Iran’s so-called ‘jihadi field diplomacy’ toward Azerbaijan during and after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. To accomplish this, I adopt a novel version of neoclassical realism, which considers the socially constructed nature of variables. The application of constructivist neoclassical realism facilitates a deeper comprehension of the reasons and mechanisms behind Iran’s embrace of unconventional interventionist policies in Azerbaijan. I argue that Iran’s jihadi field diplomacy is characterized by two main features: the use of military tools to achieve foreign policy goals and a distinct leadership structure that operates independently of the government. Then I analyze three turning points that shaped Iran’s jihadi field diplomacy toward Azerbaijan. Firstly, after a failed diplomatic mediation between Yerevan and Baku in May 1992, Iran intensified its military and ideological efforts in Azerbaijan. Secondly, during the June 1993 coup, Iran supported pro-Russian coup leader Colonel Huseynov and sought to persuade him to collaborate with ex-Communist Aliyev against nationalist President Elchibey. Aliyev later perceived this initial cooperation as a serious ideological and military challenge. Lastly, the perceived threat and Iran’s Quds Force connections to the leaders of the subsequent military uprisings adversely affected bilateral relations between Iran and Azerbaijan.
ISSN:2156-7697
Contient:Enthalten in: Politics, religion & ideology
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1080/21567689.2023.2262392