Elite-Constructed Constitutions
This article will illustrate the constitution as a result of bargaining and negotiation among the elites to allocate power and mitigate tension among them. Combining the elite’s concept and its nature of a continuous struggle for power with the approach that investigates the constitution as a contra...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
David Publishing Company
2020
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Dans: |
Cultural and religious studies
Année: 2020, Volume: 8, Numéro: 11, Pages: 603-617 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Constitution-making
B Élite B Thailand B Elite-constructed constitution |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Résumé: | This article will illustrate the constitution as a result of bargaining and negotiation among the elites to allocate power and mitigate tension among them. Combining the elite’s concept and its nature of a continuous struggle for power with the approach that investigates the constitution as a contract among the powerful ruling class, this article will reveal how power is allocated among the elites. As a result, this article provides a fundamental notion of the approach called "elite-constructed constitution". This approach delivers the instrument to investigate the constitutional making process as a negotiation mechanism among the elites, which reflects into constitutional provision. Therefore, because this type of constitution has been constructed under the contract’s notion, constitutional endurance is unexpected because this type of constitution requires a high level of trust among the contract parties. This is in contrast to the notion of the elite’s continuous struggle. |
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ISSN: | 2328-2177 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Cultural and religious studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.17265/2328-2177/2020.11.003 |