The Relevance of Emergence Theory in the Science–Religion Dialogue: with Mikael Leidenhag, “The Relevance of Emergence Theory in the Science–Religion Dialogue”; Steven L. Peck, “Life as Emergent Agential Systems: Tendencies without Teleology in an Open Universe”; and Joseph A. Bracken, “Actions and Agents: Natural and Supernatural Reconsidered”
In this article, I call into question the relevance of emergence theories as presently used by thinkers in the science–religion discussion. Specifically, I discuss theories of emergence that have been used by both religious naturalists and proponents of panentheism. I argue for the following conclus...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2013
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| Dans: |
Zygon
Année: 2013, Volume: 48, Numéro: 4, Pages: 966-983 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Emergence
B Panentheism B Reductionism B religious naturalism |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | In this article, I call into question the relevance of emergence theories as presently used by thinkers in the science–religion discussion. Specifically, I discuss theories of emergence that have been used by both religious naturalists and proponents of panentheism. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) If we take the background theory to be metaphysical realism, then there seems to be no positive connection between the reality of emergent properties and the validity of providing reality with a religious interpretation, though one could perhaps construe an argument for the positive ontological status of emergence as a negative case for a religious worldview. (2) To be considered more plausible, religious naturalism should interpret religious discourse from the perspective of pragmatic realism. (3) Panentheistic models of divine causality are unable to avoid ontological dualism. (4) It is not obvious that emergent phenomena and/or properties are nonreducible in the ontological sense of the terms; indeed, the tension between weak and strong emergence makes it difficult for the emergentist to make ontological judgments. My general conclusion is that the concept of emergence has little metaphysical significance in the dialogue between science and theology. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12046 |