On the “Use” of Neopragmatism

Abstract. The present article continues an earlier critique of Robbins's and Rorty's neopragmatism. Their skepticism about the traditional concept of correspondence and about the criteria for truth are both unjustified, and their own assertion of meaning as usefulness either presupposes a...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Clayton, Philip 1956- (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Wiley-Blackwell 1993
Dans: Zygon
Année: 1993, Volume: 28, Numéro: 3, Pages: 361-369
Sujets non-standardisés:B Postmodernism
B realism and reference
B Scientific Method
B empirical Theology
B Dewey
B neopragmatism
B Lakatos
B Rorty
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Résumé:Abstract. The present article continues an earlier critique of Robbins's and Rorty's neopragmatism. Their skepticism about the traditional concept of correspondence and about the criteria for truth are both unjustified, and their own assertion of meaning as usefulness either presupposes a prior notion of linguistic reference or fails to qualify as a sufficient criterion for knowledge. The difficulties with neopragmatism have implications for two other areas of the religion/science discussion, postmodernism and empirical Theology. Postmodernism shares neopragmatism's mistakes regarding the philosophy of language and can be rejected without endangering one's empiricism, humanism, or naturalism. By contrast, the strengths of empirical Theology, and of religious empiricism in general, can be preserved without Robbins's proposed ban on metaphysics.
ISSN:1467-9744
Contient:Enthalten in: Zygon
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.1993.tb01040.x