Functionalism, Fallibilism, and Anti–Foundationalism in Wieman's Empirical Theism
Abstract. Empirical philosophy of religion is usually appraised in light of its theological uses, rather than in terms of its relation to philosophical forms of empiricism. The present paper examines the empirical theism of Henry Nelson Wieman by relating it to Carl Hempel's critique of functio...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1987
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Dans: |
Zygon
Année: 1987, Volume: 22, Numéro: 1, Pages: 37-47 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
religious empiricism
B antifoundationalism B Henry Nelson Wieman B Popperian fallibilism B American radical empiricism B critique of functionalism |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Édition parallèle: | Non-électronique
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Résumé: | Abstract. Empirical philosophy of religion is usually appraised in light of its theological uses, rather than in terms of its relation to philosophical forms of empiricism. The present paper examines the empirical theism of Henry Nelson Wieman by relating it to Carl Hempel's critique of functionalism, Karl Popper's use of falsifiability, and the growth of post–empiricist anti–foundationalism in epis–temology. It is concluded that Wieman's argument commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent; that his theistic perspective nevertheless offers an important heuristic device in line with fal–libilism, and that his radical empiricism anticipates recent anti–foundationalist trends. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.1987.tb00834.x |