What Can God Do? What Should God Do?
The aim of this paper is to defend James Sterba’s version (2019) of the logical argument from evil against the existence of God from two objections that have been raised against it: that God cannot “logically” prevent all evils and that the moral requirements that the argument poses for God may not...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
MDPI
2022
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Dans: |
Religions
Année: 2022, Volume: 13, Numéro: 12 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Evil
B Sterba B God B logical argument from evil |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Résumé: | The aim of this paper is to defend James Sterba’s version (2019) of the logical argument from evil against the existence of God from two objections that have been raised against it: that God cannot “logically” prevent all evils and that the moral requirements that the argument poses for God may not apply to God. I argue that these objections do not refute the claim that God can prevent and should prevent any evil and do not undermine Sterba’s argument from evil to the effect that God does not exist. |
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ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Religions
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel13121178 |