Should Inherent Human Dignity Be Considered Intrinsically Heuristic?
What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hugh...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2014
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| In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Jahr: 2014, Band: 42, Heft: 4, Seiten: 770-775 |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Human Dignity
B Human Rights B Neighbor-love |
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Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallele Ausgabe: | Elektronisch
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| Zusammenfassung: | What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes (2011), human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12081 |