Prophets against Ockhamism. Or: why the hard fact/soft fact distinction is irrelevant to the problem of foreknowledge

In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs ab...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: van Riel, Raphael (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2014
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2014, Band: 75, Heft: 2, Seiten: 119-135
weitere Schlagwörter:B Hard- and soft facts
B Compatibilism
B Ockhamism
B Incompatibilism
B Divine Foreknowledge
B Freedom
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Parallele Ausgabe:Elektronisch
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs about future actions are merely soft facts, rather than hard facts about the past. Under the assumption that if Ockhamism can solve the problem of divine foreknowledge then it should also yield a solution to the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge, it is concluded that Ockhamism fails.
ISSN:1572-8684
Enthält:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-013-9430-5