Retributive karma and the problem of blaming the victim

A defining feature of retributive conceptions of karma is their regarding of suffering or misfortune as consequent upon sins committed in previous lives. Some critical non-believers in karma take offence at this view, considering it to involve unjustly blaming the victim. Defenders of the view demur...

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Auteur principal: Burley, Mikel (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2013
Dans: International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2013, Volume: 74, Numéro: 2, Pages: 149-165
Sujets non-standardisés:B Buddhism
B Arvind Sharma
B Reincarnation
B Hinduism
B Ludwig Wittgenstein
B Blaming the victim
B Karma
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Édition parallèle:Électronique
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Résumé:A defining feature of retributive conceptions of karma is their regarding of suffering or misfortune as consequent upon sins committed in previous lives. Some critical non-believers in karma take offence at this view, considering it to involve unjustly blaming the victim. Defenders of the view demur, and argue that a belief in retributive karma in fact provides a motivation for benevolent action. This article elucidates the debate, showing that its depth is such that it is best characterized as a disagreement in form of life (in Wittgenstein’s sense) rather than as a disagreement in opinions. Also briefly discussed is an example of a non-retributive form that belief in karma and reincarnation can take.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-012-9376-z