The right to believe truth paradoxes of moral regret for no belief and the role(s) of logic in philosophy of religion

I offer you some theories of intellectual obligations and rights (virtue Ethics): initially, RBT (a Right to Believe Truth, if something is true it follows one has a right to believe it), and, NDSM (one has no right to believe a contradiction, i.e., No right to commit Doxastic Self-Mutilation). Evid...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Lucas, Billy Joe (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2012
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 72, Issue: 2, Pages: 115-138
Further subjects:B Intellectual obligation
B Deontic logics
B Concepts of belief
B Variations on Clifford’s thesis
B Categorical moral truth
B Moral regret for no faith
B Modal logics
B Philosophy of religion and philosophy
B Virtue Ethics
B Necessity and time
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:Electronic

MARC

LEADER 00000naa a22000002 4500
001 1821418204
003 DE-627
005 20221110052731.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 221110s2012 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1007/s11153-012-9371-4  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1821418204 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1821418204 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 0  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Lucas, Billy Joe  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 4 |a The right to believe truth paradoxes of moral regret for no belief and the role(s) of logic in philosophy of religion 
264 1 |c 2012 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a I offer you some theories of intellectual obligations and rights (virtue Ethics): initially, RBT (a Right to Believe Truth, if something is true it follows one has a right to believe it), and, NDSM (one has no right to believe a contradiction, i.e., No right to commit Doxastic Self-Mutilation). Evidence for both below. Anthropology, Psychology, computer software, Sociology, and the neurosciences prove things about human beliefs, and History, Economics, and comparative law can provide evidence of value about theories of rights. However, insofar as we have methods within Philosophy to help us formulate precise concepts of ‘belief’ and ‘rights’, methods that also help us to prove links (or absence thereof) amongst families of concepts of rights and belief, our discipline is in and of itself capable of sound reasoning about issues as puzzling as the following. Suppose a Jane who does not believe in God yet who believes she ought to so believe: Jane is undergoing doxastic moral regret (moral regret for lack of faith). We have all known such Janes and perhaps at one time or another even been one. Paradox: given RBT and NDSM, Jane as described not only does not exist, Jane cannot exist. Thus, to enrich the ways in which Philosophy need not get all its evidence from other academic disciplines, I present a brief introduction to what I call Neutral Universal Frames (NUFs). NUFs solve hard puzzles about interactions among modal concepts of belief and rights, concepts that occur in RBT, NDSM and the description of our Janes. NUFs for theories precisely articulated via any two or more modal concepts are a powerful and immensely general set of tools enabling us to define rich theories of truth (“models on frames”) to test philosophical theories for internal consistency and to prove the existence of connections (or absence thereof) amongst alternative articulations of philosophical theories. NUFs thereby add to the constructive knowledge producing way Logics intersect with Philosophy of Religion. And we will soon see why Jane, be she named ‘Jane’ or known simply as you: cannot exist. Read on at your own risk. 
601 |a Philosophie 
601 |a Religion 
650 4 |a Deontic logics 
650 4 |a Concepts of belief 
650 4 |a Intellectual obligation 
650 4 |a Variations on Clifford’s thesis 
650 4 |a Necessity and time 
650 4 |a Categorical moral truth 
650 4 |a Moral regret for no faith 
650 4 |a Virtue Ethics 
650 4 |a Modal logics 
650 4 |a Philosophy of religion and philosophy 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t International journal for philosophy of religion  |d Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1970  |g 72(2012), 2, Seite 115-138  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)320442098  |w (DE-600)2005049-5  |w (DE-576)103746927  |x 1572-8684  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:72  |g year:2012  |g number:2  |g pages:115-138 
776 |i Erscheint auch als  |n elektronische Ausgabe  |w (DE-627)1631103768  |k Electronic 
856 |3 Volltext  |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/23324793  |x JSTOR 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9371-4  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
936 u w |d 72  |j 2012  |e 2  |h 115-138 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4208222212 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1821418204 
LOK |0 005 20221110052731 
LOK |0 008 221110||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2022-09-28#CB341505B7C2B8881BC95153F23DAA3BE866E5EC 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 866   |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/23324793 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw 
REL |a 1 
SUB |a REL