How is the question ‘Is Existence a Predicate?’ relevant to the ontological argument?

It is often said that the ontological argument fails because it wrongly treats existence as a first-level property or predicate. This has proved a controversial claim, and efforts to evaluate it are complicated by the fact that the words ‘existence is not a property/predicate’ have been used by phil...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Forgie, J. William (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2008
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2008, Volume: 64, Issue: 3, Pages: 117-133
Further subjects:B Ontological Argument
B Gassendi
B Caterus objection
B Predicates
B God
B Existence
B Kant
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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520 |a It is often said that the ontological argument fails because it wrongly treats existence as a first-level property or predicate. This has proved a controversial claim, and efforts to evaluate it are complicated by the fact that the words ‘existence is not a property/predicate’ have been used by philosophers to make at least three different negative claims: (a) one about a first-level phenomenon possessed by objects like horses, stones, you and me; (b) another about the logical form of assertions of existence; and (c) still another about a second-level phenomenon possessed by concepts when they are instantiated. I argue that only the last of these claims, originally voiced by Kant, is both plausible and relevant to the ontological argument. And I try to show that the relevance of the Kantian version comes from its providing the underlying justification for a different, and far less controversial, criticism of the ontological argument. 
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