Involuntary belief and the command to have faith

Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have a...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Hartman, Robert J. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2011
Dans: International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2011, Volume: 69, Numéro: 3, Pages: 181-192
Sujets non-standardisés:B Richard Swinburne
B Involuntary belief
B Faith
B Trust
Accès en ligne: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Édition parallèle:Électronique
Description
Résumé:Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have an obligation to exercise faith, and the moral claim that people are only responsible for actions where they have the ability to do otherwise. Put more concisely, the problem concerns the coherence of the following claims: (1) one cannot have faith, (2) one has an obligation to have faith, and (3) ought implies can. To solve this dilemma, I offer three solutions that I believe have the philosophical resources to demonstrate the consistency of these claims. Thus, I defend the claim that it is logically possible for a person to be culpable for an involuntary failure to have faith in God.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-010-9271-4