Winch and Wittgenstein on moral harm and absolute safety
This paper examines Wittgenstein’s conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch. These are that, firstly: even if someone’s life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be ha...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2010
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2010, Volume: 67, Numéro: 2, Pages: 81-94 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Ethics
B Mysticism B Winch B Ludwig B Absolute safety B Peter B Moral harm B Wittgenstein |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Édition parallèle: | Électronique
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| Résumé: | This paper examines Wittgenstein’s conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch. These are that, firstly: even if someone’s life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed; and secondly: when voiced from a first-person standpoint, the claim to be absolutely safe due to one’s virtuousness appears hubristic and self-undermining. I argue that Wittgenstein’s mystical conception of safety, unlike some others, requires no claim about one’s own virtue and hence can be construed as avoiding these problems. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-009-9214-0 |