"The metaphysical objection" and concurrentist co-operation

The foundation of W. Matthews Grant's project in Free Will and God's Universal Causality is his Non-Occasionalist version of Divine Universal Causality (NODUC), which affirms the traditional concurrentist idea that God and secondary causes cooperate non-superfluously in such a way that the...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Nebentitel:Special issue: "The Existence and Nature of Deities"
1. VerfasserIn: Miller, Timothy David 1979- (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Cambridge Univ. Press 2022
In: Religious studies
Jahr: 2022, Band: 58, Heft: 3, Seiten: 649-657
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Grant, W. Matthews / Gott / Kausalität / Gleichzeitigkeit / Okkasionalismus
RelBib Classification:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
NBC Gotteslehre
weitere Schlagwörter:B NODUC
B Concurrentism
B co-operation
B Causation
B W. Matthews Grant
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Zusammenfassung:The foundation of W. Matthews Grant's project in Free Will and God's Universal Causality is his Non-Occasionalist version of Divine Universal Causality (NODUC), which affirms the traditional concurrentist idea that God and secondary causes cooperate non-superfluously in such a way that they both produce the entire effect. Grant defends NODUC's concurrentist account by responding to ‘The Metaphysical Objection’, which alleges that concurrentism places an inconsistent set of demands upon secondary causes. I argue that Grant's responses to that objection are unconvincing, and thus, he fails to demonstrate that NODUC is a stable foundation for the rest of his project.
ISSN:1469-901X
Enthält:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0034412521000287