Nietzsche and Levinas against Innocence
There cannot perhaps be two more polarly opposed philosophers than Friedrich Nietzsche and Emmanuel Levinas, and yet when it comes to instituting moral ideals or establishing moral principles, they both paradoxically converge in suspecting them as pretenses to a false innocence. They do, however, di...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
MDPI
2022
|
| Dans: |
Religions
Année: 2022, Volume: 13, Numéro: 4 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Phenomenology
B cultures of violence B spirit of revenge B Religious Violence B Philosophy of religion B Intersubjectivity |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | There cannot perhaps be two more polarly opposed philosophers than Friedrich Nietzsche and Emmanuel Levinas, and yet when it comes to instituting moral ideals or establishing moral principles, they both paradoxically converge in suspecting them as pretenses to a false innocence. They do, however, differ concerning why such innocence is dangerous. Nietzsche sees innocence as a disguise covering violence, power, and an attempt at domination, crippling the self and destroying human relationships. For Levinas, innocence is claimed as a method of exempting oneself from responsibility. Each philosopher recommends ways of evading the pitfalls of innocence. Contrasts will be drawn between the two authors, inquiring how they might benefit from the other’s critique of such pretenses to moral innocence and critically evaluating their strategies for escaping the dangers of such pretenses. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Religions
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel13040314 |