Concessive Knowledge Attributions Cannot Be Explained Pragmatically
“I know that p but it is possible that not-p” sounds contradictory. Some philosophers, notably David , have taken this as evidence that knowledge requires infallibility. Others have attempted to undermine that inference by arguing that there is a plausible pragmatic explanation of why such sentences...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2022
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2022, Volume: 12, Numéro: 2, Pages: 171-182 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
infallibilism
B semantics of knowledge attributions B Fallibilism B concessive knowledge attributions B pragmatics of knowledge attributions |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | “I know that p but it is possible that not-p” sounds contradictory. Some philosophers, notably David , have taken this as evidence that knowledge requires infallibility. Others have attempted to undermine that inference by arguing that there is a plausible pragmatic explanation of why such sentences sound odd, and thus do not undermine fallibilism. I argue that the proffered pragmatic explanations fail and I raise challenges for any possible pragmatic explanation of the character of concessive knowledge attributions. It is reasonable to conclude that concessive knowledge attributions are genuine contradictions. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10024 |