Concessive Knowledge Attributions Cannot Be Explained Pragmatically
“I know that p but it is possible that not-p” sounds contradictory. Some philosophers, notably David , have taken this as evidence that knowledge requires infallibility. Others have attempted to undermine that inference by arguing that there is a plausible pragmatic explanation of why such sentences...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2022
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2022, Volume: 12, Issue: 2, Pages: 171-182 |
| Further subjects: | B
infallibilism
B semantics of knowledge attributions B Fallibilism B concessive knowledge attributions B pragmatics of knowledge attributions |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |