Evil and maximal greatness

By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have...

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1. VerfasserIn: Büttner, Kai Michael (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Nature B. V 2022
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2022, Band: 91, Heft: 2, Seiten: 93-109
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Plantinga, Alvin 1932- / Ontologischer Gottesbeweis / Modalität / Größe / Maximum / Kritik / Das Böse / Circulus vitiosus (Philosophie)
RelBib Classification:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
NBC Gotteslehre
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Modal problem of evil
B Maximal greatness
B Modal ontological argument
B Plantinga
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Zusammenfassung:By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have complained, but circular in the strongest sense of the term. Based on reflections on the relation between the notions of coherence and possibility, I shall defend two arguments, previously proposed by Tooley (Mind 90:422–427, 1981) and Guleserian (Nous 17:221–238, 1983), against the existence of a maximally great being. The article concludes with some critical remarks on Plantinga’s rationale for conceiving God as such a being.
ISSN:1572-8684
Enthält:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09810-1