Future truth and freedom
It is debated among open theists whether propositions about the contingent future should be regarded as straightforwardly true or false, as all false without exception, or as lacking truth-values. This article discusses some recent work on this topic and proposes a solution different than the one I...
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2021
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2021, Volume: 90, Numéro: 2, Pages: 109-119 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Richard Purtill
B Open Theism B Hard and soft facts B Alexander Pruss B Benjamin Arbour B future contingent propositions |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | It is debated among open theists whether propositions about the contingent future should be regarded as straightforwardly true or false, as all false without exception, or as lacking truth-values. This article discusses some recent work on this topic and proposes a solution different than the one I have previously endorsed. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09792-0 |