Lying to the Nazi at the Door: A Thomistic Reframing of the Classic Moral Dilemma

Moral philosophers and theologians have long debated the classic moral dilemma of lying to an intruder in order to save a refugee. This dilemma presents an especially difficult challenge to those who reject consequentialist reasoning. Many contemporary defenders of Thomas Aquinas have argued that ly...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Clem, Stewart ca. 20./21. Jh. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Wiley-Blackwell 2021
Dans: Journal of religious ethics
Année: 2021, Volume: 49, Numéro: 1, Pages: 6-32
Sujets non-standardisés:B Justice
B Lying
B Aquinas
B Virtue
B Sin
B Moral Dilemmas
B Truthfulness
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Résumé:Moral philosophers and theologians have long debated the classic moral dilemma of lying to an intruder in order to save a refugee. This dilemma presents an especially difficult challenge to those who reject consequentialist reasoning. Many contemporary defenders of Thomas Aquinas have argued that lying is never permissible under any circumstances, but none has offered a satisfactory answer to the question of what one ought to do when facing such a dilemma. I argue that there can be no morally satisfying answer to this question, because every possible action will involve some degree of sin, even if lying is the least sinful action. This should not lead us to redefine what it means to tell a lie, nor to say that lying to the intruder is a good or right action; rather, it should lead us to acknowledge the tragic dimension of life in a fallen world.
ISSN:1467-9795
Contient:Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/jore.12338