Natural Law and Ethical Non-Naturalism
There is a lack of clarity in the literature about what constitutes the natural law approach to ethics and what is incompatible with it. The standard, and largely historical, way of understanding the natural law approach risks overlooking theoretical differences of fundamental importance regarding w...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Sage
2021
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Dans: |
Studies in Christian ethics
Année: 2021, Volume: 34, Numéro: 2, Pages: 190-208 |
RelBib Classification: | KAJ Époque contemporaine NCA Éthique VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Non-naturalism
B natural law ethics B Finnis B Natural Law B new natural law B Metaethics |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Résumé: | There is a lack of clarity in the literature about what constitutes the natural law approach to ethics and what is incompatible with it. The standard, and largely historical, way of understanding the natural law approach risks overlooking theoretical differences of fundamental importance regarding what the natural law approach is usually taken to uphold. Against Craig Paterson, I argue that a necessary condition for an ethical account to uphold fully the natural law approach is that it does not contain any dependence upon the metaethical category of non-naturalism understood in non-supernaturalist (secular) terms. Using the ‘new natural law’ theory of John Finnis to illustrate my case, I also argue that an ethical theory can be largely in keeping with the natural law approach but nonetheless contain elements at odds with it: the issue is more complex than a simple binary. This is an under-explored possibility in natural law ethics. |
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ISSN: | 0953-9468 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Studies in Christian ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/0953946820962893 |