Evil and the god of indifference

The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic ath...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs: Bernáth, László (Auteur) ; Kodaj, Daniel (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2020]
Dans: International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2020, Volume: 88, Numéro: 3, Pages: 259-272
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Théisme / Le mal / Dieu / Indifférence / Athéisme
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophie de la religion
CB Spiritualité chrétienne
NBC Dieu
Sujets non-standardisés:B Bayesianism
B problem of evil
B Alternative theologies
Accès en ligne: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Description
Résumé:The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic atheism, then fine-tuning can render theism virtually certain, even in the face of evil. But if the alternatives include the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator, theism is defeated even if the fine-tuning premise is accepted. The resulting version of the evidential problem is unsolvable using the tools that are currently deployed by theists against evil.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09747-x