Evil and the god of indifference
The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic ath...
Auteurs: | ; |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2020]
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Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2020, Volume: 88, Numéro: 3, Pages: 259-272 |
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Théisme
/ Le mal
/ Dieu
/ Indifférence
/ Athéisme
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion CB Spiritualité chrétienne NBC Dieu |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Bayesianism
B problem of evil B Alternative theologies |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Résumé: | The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic atheism, then fine-tuning can render theism virtually certain, even in the face of evil. But if the alternatives include the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator, theism is defeated even if the fine-tuning premise is accepted. The resulting version of the evidential problem is unsolvable using the tools that are currently deployed by theists against evil. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09747-x |