Flannery O'Connor and religious epistemology
What are the demands of religious inquiry? It can be tempting to think of these demands in strictly epistemic terms, e.g. as a function of the inquirer's background beliefs, cognitive faculties, natural cognitive ability, intellectual skills, and intellectual character. In this article, I extra...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2020]
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Dans: |
Religious studies
Année: 2020, Volume: 56, Numéro: 3, Pages: 349-369 |
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
O'Connor, Flannery 1925-1964
/ Religion
/ Logique épistémique
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NCA Éthique |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Résumé: | What are the demands of religious inquiry? It can be tempting to think of these demands in strictly epistemic terms, e.g. as a function of the inquirer's background beliefs, cognitive faculties, natural cognitive ability, intellectual skills, and intellectual character. In this article, I extrapolate an alternative model of religious inquiry from three stories by the Southern Gothic writer Flannery O'Connor (1925-1964). According to the model, a person's fitness for religious inquiry also depends on whether she possesses a certain moral posture. In particular, I argue that something like moral humility functions as an epistemic virtue in the theistic domain. |
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ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412518000562 |