The Responsibility Objection to Abortion: Rejecting the Notion that the Responsibility Objection Successfully Refutes a Woman's Right to Choose
This article considers the objection to abortion that a woman who voluntarily engages in sexual activity is responsible for her fetus and so cannot have an abortion. The conclusion argued for is that the conceptions of responsibility that can ground the objection that are considered do not necessita...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2015]
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| Dans: |
Bioethics
Année: 2015, Volume: 29, Numéro: 4, Pages: 291-299 |
| RelBib Classification: | NCB Éthique individuelle NCH Éthique médicale VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Thomson
B Consent B Harm B Negligence B Responsibility B Abortion B Care |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | This article considers the objection to abortion that a woman who voluntarily engages in sexual activity is responsible for her fetus and so cannot have an abortion. The conclusion argued for is that the conceptions of responsibility that can ground the objection that are considered do not necessitate a requirement on the part of a pregnant woman to carry her pregnancy to term. Thus, the iterations of the responsibility objection presented cannot be used to curtail reproductive choice. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12097 |