The future-like-ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism
Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems t...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2018]
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Dans: |
Bioethics
Année: 2018, Volume: 32, Numéro: 3, Pages: 199-204 |
RelBib Classification: | VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
unrestricted composition
B Contraception B future-like-ours argument B Abortion B Animalism |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Résumé: | Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals. |
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ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12417 |