It is better to be ignorant of our moral enhancement: A reply to Zambrano

In a recent issue of Bioethics, I argued that compulsory moral bioenhancement should be administered covertly. Alexander Zambrano has criticized this argument on two fronts. First, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that the prevention of ultimate harm by covert moral bioenhancement fails to meet...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Crutchfield, Parker (Author)
Contributors: Zambrano, Alexander (Bibliographic antecedent)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Wiley-Blackwell [2020]
In: Bioethics
Year: 2020, Volume: 34, Issue: 2, Pages: 190-194
RelBib Classification:NCH Medical ethics
ZC Politics in general
Further subjects:B public health ethic
B Quarantine
B Framing effects
B Autonomy
B Enhancement
B moral epistemology
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:In a recent issue of Bioethics, I argued that compulsory moral bioenhancement should be administered covertly. Alexander Zambrano has criticized this argument on two fronts. First, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that the prevention of ultimate harm by covert moral bioenhancement fails to meet conditions for permissible liberty-restricting public health interventions. Second, contrary to my claim, Zambrano claims that covert moral bioenhancement undermines autonomy to a greater degree than does overt moral bioenhancement. In this paper, I rebut both of these arguments, then finish by noting important avenues of research that Zambrano’s arguments motivate.
ISSN:1467-8519
Reference:Kritik von "Covert moral bioenhancement, public health, and autonomy (2019)"
Contains:Enthalten in: Bioethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12685