What ontological arguments don’t show
Daniel Dombrowski contends that: (1) a number of versions of the ontological argument [OA] are sound; (2) the deity whose existence is most well established by the OA is the deity picked out by Hartshorne’s neoclassical concept of God; (3) skeptics who insist that the OA only shows that “if God exis...
1. VerfasserIn: | |
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Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2020]
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2020, Band: 88, Heft: 1, Seiten: 97-114 |
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Gottesfrage
/ Ontologischer Gottesbeweis
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RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus NBC Gotteslehre |
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Volltext (Verlag) |
Zusammenfassung: | Daniel Dombrowski contends that: (1) a number of versions of the ontological argument [OA] are sound; (2) the deity whose existence is most well established by the OA is the deity picked out by Hartshorne’s neoclassical concept of God; (3) skeptics who insist that the OA only shows that “if God exists, then God exists necessarily” are contradicting themselves, and (4) the OA is worth a great deal since it effectively demonstrates the rationality of theism. I argue that theses (2) and (3) are clearly false and offer a presumptive case for thinking that (4) is false, since, absent an independent proof of God’s existence, the theist appears to be in no position to rationally assert (1). I also show that the Anselmian OA harmonizes rather poorly with a Hartshornean neoclassical conception of God. I conclude by assessing the philosophical and dialectical worth of ontological arguments vis-à-vis establishing the rationality of theism. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-019-09718-x |