Divine Hiddenness and the Suffering Unbeliever Argument

In this essay, I propose two arguments from Thomas Aquinas’s reflection on theism and faith to rebut Schellenberg’s claim that divine hiddenness justifies atheism. One of those arguments, however, may be employed so as to re-propose Schellenberg’s conviction, which is crucial to his argument, that t...

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1. VerfasserIn: Ceglie, Roberto Di (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2020]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2020, Band: 12, Heft: 2, Seiten: 211-235
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Thomas, von Aquin, Heiliger 1225-1274 / Schellenberg, J. L. 1959- / Deus absconditus / Atheismus / Ungläubiger / Leid
RelBib Classification:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
NBC Gotteslehre
weitere Schlagwörter:B Aquinas
B Evidence
B Faith
B Schellenberg
B non-resistant unbelievers
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Zusammenfassung:In this essay, I propose two arguments from Thomas Aquinas’s reflection on theism and faith to rebut Schellenberg’s claim that divine hiddenness justifies atheism. One of those arguments, however, may be employed so as to re-propose Schellenberg’s conviction, which is crucial to his argument, that there are ‘non-resistant’ or ‘inculpable’ unbelievers. I then advance what I call the suffering unbeliever argument . In short, the unbelievers mentioned by Schellenberg are expected to suffer because of their non-belief, which—as Schellenberg says—prevents them from achieving the greatest possible well-being. If they suffer, however, they cannot consider themselves unbelievers , since one cannot suffer from not having been given a certain good if one believes that the good in question has never existed. If they do not suffer, on the other hand, there is simply nothing for which they can consider themselves inculpable (and God culpable ).
Enthält:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v0i0.2956